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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
John James Kramer appeals from his conviction for possession of sexually
exploitative materials. On appeal he challenges the denial of his motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Kramer with eight counts of possession of sexually exploitative
material. (R., pp. 48-51.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Kramer pled guilty to four counts
in exchange for dismissal of four counts, with a binding sentencing recommendation of six
years with one and one-half years determinate on each count, to be served concurrently.
(R., pp. 133-34.)
Kramer moved to withdraw his guilty pleas. (R., pp. 194-95.) He contended that
“letters from Mr. Kramer’s counselor” and an offer of proof of what Kramer’s girlfriend
would testify to showed Kramer’s “lack of understanding when he entered his guilty plea.”
(4/17/17 Tr., p. 33, L. 6 – p. 36, L. 11.) Utilizing the applicable legal standards and
referencing matters in the record (including the written plea agreement, the guilty plea
proceedings, the competency evaluation, and the submission by Kramer), the district court
concluded Kramer’s guilty plea was knowingly entered and that good cause was not
established, and therefore denied the motion. (4/17/17 Tr., p. 38, L. 23 – p. 48, L. 1.) The
case proceeded to sentencing, where the district court imposed concurrent sentences of six
years with one and one-half years determinate. (R., pp. 312-18.) Kramer filed a timely
notice of appeal. (R., pp. 319-22.)

1

ISSUE
Kramer states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
Kramer’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, because Mr. Kramer’s lack of
understanding was a just reason to withdraw his plea?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Kramer failed to show the district court abused its discretion because he has
failed to show error in the district court’s factual finding that he entered a knowing guilty
plea?
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ARGUMENT
Kramer Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Kramer’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, finding that

he had established neither that his guilty plea was unconstitutional nor good cause for its
withdrawal. (4/17/17 Tr., p. 38, L. 23 – p. 48, L. 1.) Kramer contends the district court
abused its discretion because he put on evidence that he did not understand the
consequences of his plea or the terms of the plea agreement. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 1117.) The record, however, shows that the district court rejected Kramer’s factual claims
on the basis of conflicting evidence. (4/17/17 Tr., p. 38, L. 23 – p. 48, L. 1.) Because
Kramer does not claim the district court’s factual findings were clear error, and because
his argument that the district court abused its discretion because he presented evidence
contrary to those findings is without merit, Kramer’s claim of an abuse of discretion fails.

B.

Standard Of Review
Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to

determining whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion, as distinguished
from arbitrary action. State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 483, 861 P.2d 51, 53 (1993); State v.
Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 284 (1990); State v. Jackson, 96 Idaho 584,
587, 532 P.2d 926, 929 (1975). An appellate court will defer to the trial court’s factual
findings if they are supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. Holland, 135
Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000).
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C.

The District Court’s Factual Findings Are Supported By The Record
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be made before sentence is imposed. I.C.R.

33(c). The presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an automatic right, however.
Carrasco, 117 Idaho at 298, 787 P.2d at 284; State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535, 211
P.3d 775, 780 (Ct. App. 2008). The defendant bears the burden of proving, in the district
court, that the plea should be withdrawn. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780.
In ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the district court must determine,
as a threshold matter, whether the plea was entered knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily. State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991). The plea was
voluntary if the defendant “understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced,”
knowingly and intelligently waived his or her rights, and “understood the consequences of
pleading guilty.” State v. Williston, 159 Idaho 215, 218, 358 P.3d 776, 779 (Ct. App. 2015)
(citations omitted).
If the plea was constitutionally valid, then the court must determine whether other
reasons exist to allow the defendant to withdraw the plea. Mauro, 121 Idaho at 180, 824
P.2d at 111. When the motion to withdraw is made prior to sentencing, the defendant must
present a just reason for withdrawing the plea. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at
780. “The good faith, credibility, and weight of the defendant’s assertions in support of
his motion to withdraw his plea are matters for the trial court to decide.” State v. Anderson,
156 Idaho 230, 233, 322 P.3d 312, 315 (Ct. App. 2014).
The district court applied these legal standards to the motion. (4/17/17 Tr., p. 38,
L. 23 – p. 39, L. 24.) The district court found that Kramer had signed a plea agreement
that was “very detailed” and informed him what the maximum sentences were, which
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charges were being pled to and which dismissed, the state’s binding plea recommendation
of concurrent sentences of six years with one and one-half years determinate with the
defense free to argue for less, and other terms. (4/17/17 Tr., p. 39, L. 25 – p. 42, L. 5.)
These findings are supported by the record. (R., p. 134.)
The district court also found that the terms and conditions of the plea agreement
and the other information necessary for a knowing and voluntary plea were specifically
addressed at the plea hearing and Kramer affirmatively represented his understanding of
those matters. (4/17/17 Tr., p. 42, L. 6 – p. 43, L. 10.) This finding is also supported by
the record. (6/7/16 Tr., p. 4, L. 25 – p. 19, L. 14.)
The district court addressed Kramer’s mental capacity. (4/17/17 Tr., p. 43, L. 11 –
p. 45, L. 18.) The court specifically considered the information in the competency
evaluation (4/17/17 Tr., p. 43, L. 11 – p. 44, L. 25), and the materials submitted by Kramer
in support of his motion (4/17/17 Tr., p. 44, L. 25 – p. 45, L. 4). The district court noted a
“difference of opinion regarding the intellectual abilities or capabilities of Mr. Kramer”
between the competency evaluators and the “treatment folks.” (4/17/17 Tr., p. 45, Ls. 213.) The district court concluded that there was not enough of a conflict to demonstrate
good cause to withdraw the plea. (4/17/17 Tr., p. 45, Ls. 14-18.) The district court,
acknowledging the evidence of Kramer’s “challenges in communication,” instead made “a
finding that there was a knowing and voluntary and intelligent guilty plea.” (4/17/17 Tr.,
p. 45, L. 19 – p. 46, L. 16.) This factual finding, based on conflicting evidence, is supported
by the record. (Competency Evaluation—Adult Proceedings (exhibit).)
Finally, the district court applied the legal standards to its finding of a knowing,
intelligent and voluntary plea and found neither a constitutional deficiency in the plea nor
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good cause to withdraw it. (4/17/17 Tr., p. 46, L. 17 – p. 47, L. 16.) Because the district
court properly applied the correct legal standards to a finding of fact supported by the
record it did not abuse its discretion.
On appeal Kramer “asserts his lack of understanding was a just reason to withdraw
the guilty plea, because it meant the plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, or
voluntarily.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 12.) This argument is premised upon his contention
that “the record as a whole” shows his “lack of understanding.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 12.)
To show that the “record as a whole” shows a lack of understanding Kramer points out that
his “counsel related” that he believed he would receive a six month sentence and that, “as
counsel put it,” Kramer believed the court and prosecutor were “against him.” (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 12-13.) This argument does not even challenge, much less show clear error, in
the district court’s contrary factual findings.
Kramer next argues the district court erred when it “relied in part on the evaluation
committee report” on competency because it was of “limited use” in determining whether
his plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-14.) It is true
that a finding of competence is not enough alone to find a plea meets constitutional
requirements. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993) (“In addition to determining
that a defendant who seeks to plead guilty or waive counsel is competent, a trial court must
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satisfy itself that the waiver of his constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary.” 1). The
competency evaluation was, however, highly relevant to Kramer’s factual claim, supported
with evidence from his treatment providers, that he did not understand the consequences
of his plea because of his diminished mental capacity. The district court correctly reviewed
the evidence of Kramer’s mental capacity, both the evidence Kramer submitted and the
evidence already in the record, and found that the plea was knowing and voluntary and that
Kramer did not show good cause to withdraw the guilty plea. Kramer’s argument that the
district court erred by considering the competency evaluation is meritless.
Next, Kramer suggests that the plea colloquy supports his assertions. (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 14-15.) He does not, however, claim or show clear error. His invitation to simply
re-weigh the evidence on appeal must be rejected.
Finally, Kramer argues that “even if his lack of understanding did not rise to the
level of a constitutional defect … [it] nonetheless was a just reason to withdraw the plea.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-16.) This argument suffers the same fatal flaw as the others.
Because the court factually rejected Kramer’s claim of a lack of understanding, Kramer
established neither a constitutional defect nor good cause for withdrawal.

1

The state disagrees with Kramer’s counsel’s assertion that “the standard for entering a
guilty plea is heightened when compared to the standard for being competent to stand trial”
to the extent he is claiming a heightened competency standard. (Appellant’s brief, p. 13.)
The competency standard is the same, even if the test for a valid guilty plea or other waiver
of rights requires more than mere competency alone. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400-01. See
also Godinez, 509 U.S. at 402 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“I am in full agreement with the
Court’s decision that the competency standard for pleading guilty and waiving the right to
counsel is the same as the test of competency to stand trial.”); Workman v. State, 144 Idaho
518, 527, 164 P.3d 798, 807 (2007) (“Under the test articulated in Godinez, a defendant
who is competent to enter a guilty plea must have a rational understanding of the
proceedings against him and must be able to assist in his own defense.”).
7

The district court rejected Kramer’s factual claims that he did not understand the
terms of his plea agreement or the consequences of his plea. Kramer does not challenge
the district court’s factual findings on appeal. Kramer’s legal arguments therefore fail to
show an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of conviction.
DATED this 21st day of May, 2018.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_______________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 21st day of May, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy
to:
BEN P. McGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen______________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
KKJ/dd
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